There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free-riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequity aversion the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the inequity averse types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior. 
Abstract
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free-riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequity aversion the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the inequity averse types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all economic models assume that all people are exclusively pursuing their material self-interest and do not care about "social" goals per se. This may be true for some (may be many) people, but it is certainly not true for everybody. By now we have substantial evidence suggesting that fairness motives affect the behavior of many people. The empirical results of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1986] , for example, indicate that firms' short run pricing decisions are affected by customers' fairness considerations. There is by now also a lot of evidence suggesting that firms' wage setting is constrained by workers' views about what constitutes a fair wage [Blinder and Choi 1990; Agell and Lundborg 1995; Bewley 1995; Campbell and Kamlani 1997] . According to these studies a major reason for firms' refusal to cut wages in a recession is the fear that pay cuts will violate workers' fairness concerns which in turn is expected to affect work morale adversely. There are also many well-controlled bilateral bargaining experiments which indicate that a nonnegligible fraction of the subjects does not care solely about material payoffs [Güth and Tietz 1990; Roth 1995; Camerer and Thaler 1995] .
These experiments are designed such that, according to the self-interest model, one player has all the bargaining power so that the other player is predicted to receive nothing. Contrary to this prediction the vast majority of "powerful" players offers between 40 and 50% of the bargaining surplus to the "weak" players because they anticipate that unfairly low offers will be rejected.
Although these facts suggest that many people resist unfair outcomes it would clearly be equally wrong to assume that all people are motivated by fairness considerations. Most of us know at least some people whom we consider as rather self-interested. In fact, in competitive experimental markets with complete contracts, in which a well defined homogeneous good is traded, almost all subjects behave as if they are only interested in their material payoff. Even if the competitive equilibrium implies an extremely uneven distribution of the gains from trade, equilibrium is reached within a few periods [Smith and Williams 1990; Roth, Prasnikar, OkunoFujiwara, and Zamir 1991; Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992; Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere 1997] .
There is similarly conflicting evidence with regard to cooperation. Social reality provides many examples indicating that humans are more cooperative than is assumed in the standard selfinterest model. Well known examples are that many people vote, pay their taxes honestly, participate in unions and protest movements, or work hard in teams even when the pecuniary incentives go in the opposite direction.
1 That people seem to be more cooperative than predicted by the standard self-interest model is also supported by laboratory experiments [Dawes and Thaler 1988, Ledyard 1995] . Under some conditions it has even been shown that subjects 1 On voting see Mueller [1989] . Skinner and Slemroad [1985] show that the standard self interest model substantially underpredicts the number of honest taxpayers. Successful team production in, e.g., Japanese-managed auto factories in North America is described in Rehder [1990] . Whyte [1955] discusses how workers establish "production norms" under piece rate systems.
achieve nearly complete cooperation although the self-interest model predicts complete defection [ Isaac and Walker 1988 , Ostrom and Walker 1991 . 2 However, as we will see in more detail in Section IV there are also those conditions in which a vast majority of subjects completely defects as predicted by the self-interest model.
There is thus a bewildering variety of evidence. Some pieces of evidence suggest that many people are driven by fairness considerations, other pieces indicate that virtually all people behave as if completely selfish and still other types of evidence suggest that cooperation motives are crucial. In this paper we ask whether this conflicting evidence can be explained by a single simple model. Our answer to this question is affirmative if one is willing to assume that, in addition to purely self interested people, there is a fraction of people who is also motivated by self-centered inequity aversion. No other deviations from the standard economic approach are necessary to account for the evidence. In particular, we do not relax the rationality assumption 3 .
Inequity aversion means that people resist inequitable outcomes, i. e., they are willing to
give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more equitable outcomes. Inequity aversion is self-centered if people do not care per se about inequity that exists among other people but are only interested in the fairness of their own material payoff relative to the payoff of others. We show that in the presence of inequity averse people "fair" and "cooperative" as well as "competitive" and "non-cooperative" behavioral patterns can be explained in a coherent framework. A main insight of our examination is that the heterogeneity of preferences interacts in important ways with the economic environment. We show, in particular, that the economic environment determines the preference type that is decisive for the prevailing behavior in equilibrium. This means, for example, that under certain competitive conditions a single purely selfish player can induce a large number of extremely inequity averse players to behave in a completely selfish manner, too. Likewise, under certain conditions for the provision of a public good, a single selfish player is capable of inducing all other players to contribute nothing to the public good although the others may care a lot about equity. We also show, however, that there are circumstances in which the existence of a few inequity averse players creates incentives for a majority of purely selfish types to contribute to the public good. Moreover, the existence of inequity averse types may also induce selfish types to pay prices above the competitive level.
This reveals that, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, the economic environment has a whole new dimension of effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present our model of inequity aversion. Section III applies this model to bilateral bargaining and market games. In Section IV cooperation games with and without punishments are considered. In Section V we show that, on the basis of plausible assumptions about preference parameters, the majority of individual choices in ultimatum and market and cooperation games considered in the previous sections can be explained. Section VI deals with the dictator game and with the gift exchange game. In Section VII we discuss potential objections to our model and compare it to alternative approaches. Section VIII concludes.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF SELF-CENTERED INEQUITY AVERSION
An individual is inequity averse if it dislikes outcomes that are perceived as inequitable. This definition raises, of course, the difficult question how individuals measure or perceive the fairness of outcomes. Fairness judgments are inevitably based on a kind of neutral reference outcome. The reference outcome that is used to evaluate a given situation is itself the product of complicated social comparison processes. In social psychology [Festinger 1954; Stouffer et al. 1949; Homans 1961; Adams 1963] and sociology [Davis 1959; Pollis 1968; Runciman 1966 ] the relevance of social comparison processes has been emphasized for a long time. One key insight of this literature is that relative material payoffs affect people's well being and behavior. As we will see below, without the assumption that at least for some people relative payoffs matter it is difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of the empirical regularities observed in many experiments. There is, moreover, direct empirical evidence for the importance of relative payoffs. Agell and Lundborg [1995] and Bewley [1998] , for example, provide evidence that relative payoff considerations constitute an important constraint for the internal wage structure of firms. In addition, Clark and Oswald [1996] show that comparison incomes have a significant impact on overall job satisfaction. They construct a comparison income level for a random sample of roughly 10.000 British individuals by computing a standard earnings equation. This earnings equation determines the predicted or expected wage of an individual with given socio-economic characteristics. Then they examine the impact of this comparison wage on overall job satisfaction. Their main result is that -holding other things constant -the comparison income has a large and significantly negative impact on overall job satisfaction.
Strong evidence for the importance of relative payoffs is also provided by Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman [1989] . These authors asked subjects to ordinally rank outcomes that differ in the distribution of payoffs between the subject and a comparison person. On the basis of these ordinal rankings the authors estimate how relative material payoffs enter the person's utility function. The results show that subjects exhibit a strong and robust aversion against disadvantageous inequality: For a given own income x i subjects rank outcomes in which a comparison person earns more than x i substantially lower than an outcome with equal material payoffs. Many subjects also exhibit an aversion against advantageous inequality although this effect seems to be significantly weaker than the aversion against disadvantageous inequality.
The determination of the relevant reference group and the relevant reference outcome for a given class of individuals is ultimately an empirical question. The social context, the saliency of particular agents and the social proximity among individuals are all likely to influence reference groups and outcomes. Because in the following we restrict attention to individual behavior in economic experiments we have to make assumptions about reference groups and outcomes that are likely to prevail in this context. In the laboratory it is usually much simpler to define what is perceived as an equitable allocation by the subjects. The subjects enter the laboratory as equals, they don't know anything about each other, and they are allocated to different roles in the experiment at random. Thus, it is natural to assume that the reference group is simply the set of subjects playing against each other and that the reference point is equality. Hence, for the purpose of this paper, we assume that inequity aversion can be approximated by inequality aversion.
More precisely, we assume the following. First, in addition to the purely selfish subjects, there are subjects who dislike being worse off in material terms than the other players in the experiment. Second, there are also some subjects who dislike being better off. Finally, we assume that, in general, subjects suffer more from inequality that is to their disadvantage than from advantageous inequality. Formally, consider a set of n players indexed by i∈{1,...,n} and let x=(x 1 ,...,x n ) denote the vector of monetary payoffs. The utility function of player i∈{1,...,n} is given by
where we assume β i ≤ α i and 0 ≤ β i < 1. In the two-player case (1) simplifies to
The second term in (1) or (2) measures the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality, while the third term measures the loss from advantageous inequality. Figure 1 illustrates the utility of player i as a function of x j for a given income x i . Given his own monetary payoff x i , player i's utility function obtains a maximum at x j = x i . The utility loss from disadvantageous inequality (x j > x i ) is larger than the utility loss if player i is better off than player j (x j < x i ).
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To evaluate the implications of this utility function let us start with the two-player case. 4 In all experiments considered in this paper the monetary payoff functions of all subjects were common knowledge. Note that for inequality aversion to be behaviorally important it is not necessary that subjects are informed about the final monetary payoffs of the other subjects. As long as subjects' material payoff functions are common knowledge they can compute the distributional implications of any (expected) strategy profile, i. e., inequity aversion can affect their decisions.
For simplicity we assume that the utility function is linear in inequality aversion as well as in x i .
This implies that the marginal rate of substitution between monetary income and inequality is constant. This may not be fully realistic, but we will show that surprisingly many experimental observations that seem to contradict each other can be explained on the basis of this very simple utility function already. However, we will also see that some observations in dictator experiments suggest that there is a nonnegligible fraction of people who exhibit nonlinear inequality aversion in the domain of advantageous inequality (see Section VI below).
FIGURE I Preferences with Inequity Aversion
Furthermore, the assumption α i ≥ β i captures the idea that a player suffers more from inequality that is to his disadvantage. The above mentioned paper by Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman [1989] provides strong evidence that this assumption is, in general, valid. Note that α i ≥ β i essentially means that a subject is loss averse in social comparisons: Negative deviations from the reference outcome count more than positive deviations. There is a large literature indicating the relevance of loss aversion in other domains [e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992] . Hence, it seems natural that loss aversion also affects social comparisons.
We also assume that 0 ≤ β i < 1. β i ≥ 0 means that we rule out the existence of subjects who like to be better off than others. We impose this assumption here although we believe that there are subjects with β i < 0. 5 The reason is that in the context of the experiments we consider 5 For convincing evidence see Frank [1985] .
individuals with β i < 0 have virtually no impact on equilibrium behavior. This is in itself an interesting insight that will be discussed extensively in Section VII. To interpret the restriction β i < 1 suppose that player i has a higher monetary payoff than player j. In this case β i = 0.5 implies that player i is just indifferent between keeping 1 Dollar to himself and giving this Dollar to player j. If β i = 1, then player i is prepared to throw away 1 Dollar in order to reduce his advantage relative to player j which seems very implausible. This is why we do not consider the case β i ≥ 1. On the other hand, there is no justification to put an upper bound on α i. To see this suppose that player i has a lower monetary payoff than player j. In this case player i is prepared to give up one Dollar of his own monetary payoff if this reduces the payoff of his opponent by (1+α i )/α i Dollars. For example, if α i = 4, then player i is willing to give up one Dollar if this reduces the payoff of his opponent by 1.25 Dollars. We will see that observable behavior in bargaining and public good games suggests that there are at least some individuals with such high α's.
If there are n > 2 players, player i compares his income to all other n-1 players. In this case the disutility from inequality has been normalized by dividing the second and third term by n-1. This normalization is necessary to make sure that the relative impact of inequality aversion on player i's total payoff is independent of the number of players. Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that the disutility from inequality is self-centered in the sense that player i compares himself to each of the other players, but he does not care per se about inequalities within the group of his opponents.
III. FAIRNESS, RETALIATION AND COMPETITION -ULTIMATUM AND MARKET GAMES
In this section we apply our model to a well known simple bargaining game -the ultimatum game -and to simple market games in which one side of the market competes for an indivisible good. As we will see below a considerable body of experimental evidence indicates that in the ultimatum game the gains from trade are shared relatively equally while in market games very unequal distributions are frequently observed. Hence, any alternative to the standard self-interest model faces the challenge to explain both "fair" outcomes in the ultimatum game and "competitive" and rather "unfair" outcomes in market games.
A. The Ultimatum game
In an ultimatum game a proposer and a responder bargain about the distribution of a surplus of fixed size. and is indifferent between accepting and rejecting s = 0. Therefore, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the proposer offers s = 0, which is accepted by the responder.
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By now there are numerous experimental studies from different countries, with different stake sizes and different experimental procedures, that clearly refute this prediction [for overviews see Güth and Tietz 1990 , Camerer and Thaler 1995 , Roth 1995 . The following regularities can be considered as robust facts (see Table I rejection tends to decrease with s. Regularities (i) to (iv) continue to hold for rather high stake sizes, as indicated by the results of Cameron [1995] , Hoffman, McCabe and Smith [1996] and Slonim and Roth [1997] . The 200,000 Rupia in the second experiment of Cameron (see Table I) are, e. g., equivalent to three months' income for the Indonesian subjects. Overall, roughly 60 -80 percent of the offers in Table I To what extent is our model capable of accounting for the stylized facts of the ultimatum game? To answer this question suppose that the proposer's preferences are represented by (α 1 , β 1 ) while the responder's preferences are characterized by (α 2 , β 2 ). The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium outcome as a function of theses parameters. PROPOSITION 1. It is a dominant strategy for the responder to accept any offer s ≥ 0.5, to reject s if s < s'(α 2 ) ≡ α 2 /(1+2α 2 ) < 0.5, and to accept s > s'(α 2 ). If the proposer knows the preferences of the responder, he will offer 6 Given that the proposer can choose s continuously, any offer s>0 cannot be an equilibrium offer since there always exists an s' with 0 < s' < s which is also accepted by the responder and yields a strictly higher payoff to the proposer. Furthermore, it cannot be an equilibrium that the proposer offers s=0 which is rejected by the responder with positive probability. In this case the proposer would do better by slightly raising his price in which case the responder would accept with probability 1. Hence, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is that the proposer offers s=0 which is accepted by the responder. If there is a smallest money unit ε , then there exists a second subgame perfect equilibrium in which the responder accepts any s∈ [ε,1] and rejects s = 0 while the proposer offers ε.
If the proposer does not know the preferences of the responder but believes that α 2 is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(α 2 ),
where
, then the probability (from the perspective of the proposer) that an offer s < 0.5 is going to be accepted is given by
Hence, the optimal offer of the proposer is given by 
Proof:
If s ≥ 0.5 the utility of a responder from accepting s is U 2 (s) = s -β 2 (2s-1), which is always positive for β 2 < 1 and thus better than a rejection which yields a payoff of 0. The point is that the responder can achieve equality only by destroying the entire surplus which is very costly to him if s ≥ 0.5, i.e., if the inequality is to his advantage. For s < 0.5 a responder accepts the offer only if the utility from acceptance, U 2 (s) = s -α 2 (1-2s), is nonnegative which is the case only if s exceeds the acceptance threshold
At stage 1 a proposer never offers s > 0.5. This would reduce his monetary payoff as compared to an offer of s=0.5, which would also be accepted with certainty and which would yield perfect equality. If β 1 > 0.5 his utility is strictly increasing in s for all s ≤ 0.5. This is the case where the proposer prefers to share his resources rather than to maximize his own monetary payoff, so he will offer s=0. In Section V we go beyond the predictions implied by Proposition 1. There we ask whether there is a distribution of preferences that can explain not just the major facts of the ultimatum game but also the facts in market and cooperation games which will be discussed in the next sections.
B. Market Game with Proposer Competition
It is a well established experimental fact that in a broad class of market games prices converge to the competitive equilibrium. [Smith 1982, Davis and Holt 1993] . For our purposes, the interesting fact is that convergence to the competitive equilibrium can be observed even if that equilibrium is very "unfair" by virtually any conceivable definition of fairness, i.e., if all of the gains from trade are reaped by one side of the market. This empirical feature of competition can be demonstrated in a simple market game in which many price setting sellers (proposers) want to sell one unit of a good to a single buyer (responder) who demands only one unit of the good. We deliberately restrict our attention to simple market games for two reasons: (i) The potential impact of inequity aversion can be seen most clearly in such simple games. (ii) They allow for an explicit game-theoretic analysis. In particular, it is easy to establish the identity between the competitive equilibrium and the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in these games. Notice that some experimental market games, like e.g. the continuous double auction as developed by Smith [1962] , have such complicated strategy spaces that no complete game-theoretic analysis is yet available. For attempts in this direction see Friedman and Rust [1993] . The formal proof of the proposition is relegated to the Appendix, but the intuition is quite straightforward. Note first that, for similar reasons as in the ultimatum game, the responder must accept any s ≥ 0.5. Suppose that he rejects a "low" offer s < 0.5. This cannot happen on the equilibrium path either since in this case proposer i can improve his payoff by offering s i = 0.5 which is accepted with probability 1 and gives him a strictly higher payoff. Hence, on the equilibrium path s must be accepted. Consider now any equilibrium candidate with s < 1. If there is one player i offering s i < s , then this player should have offered slightly more than s .
There will be inequality anyway, but by winning the competition player i can increase his own monetary payoff and he can turn the inequality to his advantage. A similar argument applies if all players offer s i = s < 1 . By slightly increasing his offer player i can increase the probability of winning the competition from 1/(n-1) to 1. Again, this increases his expected monetary payoff and it turns the inequality towards the other proposers to his advantage. Therefore, s < 1 cannot be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence, the only equilibrium candidate is that at least two sellers offer s = 1. This is a subgame perfect equilibrium since all sellers receive a payoff of 0 and no player can change this outcome by changing his action. The formal proof in the Appendix extends this argument to the possibility of mixed strategies. This extension also shows that the competitive outcome must be the unique equilibrium outcome in the game with incomplete information where proposers do not know each others utility functions.
Proposition 2 demonstrates the power of competition. It shows that the introduction of inequity aversion does not affect the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome relative to the prediction of the standard model that assumes purely selfish preferences. Even if all players strongly dislike inequality, competition makes it impossible for any of them to enforce an equitable outcome. The proposition also shows that competition between proposers renders the distribution of preferences completely irrelevant. It does not matter for the outcome whether there are many or only a few subjects who exhibit strong inequity aversion. By the same token it also does not matter whether the players know or do not know the preferences of the other distribution of the remaining sellers is compatible with equilibrium.
players. The outcome of the game is in a sense "preference-free", i.e., the institution of proposer competition alone shapes the equilibrium outcome. This also explains why markets in all four countries quickly converged to the competitive outcome even though the results of the ultimatum games, that have also been conducted in these countries, are consistent with the view that the distribution of preferences differs across countries.
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C. Market Game with Responder Competition
In this section we apply our model of inequity aversion to a market game for which it is probably too early to speak of well established stylized facts since only one study with a relatively small number of independent observations [Güth, Marchand, Rulliere 1997] has been conducted so far. The game concerns a situation in which there is one proposer but many responders competing against each other. The rules of the game are as follows. The proposer, who is denoted as player 1, proposes a share s∈[0,1] to the responders. There are 2,...,n responders who observe s and decide simultaneously whether to accept or reject s. Then a random draw selects with equal probability one of the accepting responders. In case that all responders reject s all players receive a monetary payoff of zero. In case of acceptance of at least one responder the proposer receives 1-s and the randomly selected responder gets paid s. All other responders receive zero. Note that in this game there is competition in the second stage of the game while in Section III.B. we had competing players in the first stage.
The prediction of the standard model with purely selfish preferences for this game is again straightforward. Responders accept any positive s and are indifferent between accepting and rejecting s=0. Therefore, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the proposer offers s=0 which is accepted by at least one responder. 10 The results of Güth et al. show that the standard model captures the regularities of this game rather well. The acceptance thresholds of responders quickly converged to very low levels. 11 Although the game was repeated only five times, in the final period the average acceptance threshold is well below 5 percent of the available surplus with 71 percent of the responders stipulating a threshold of exactly zero and 9 percent a threshold of s' = 0.02. Likewise, in period five the average offer declined to 15 percent of the available gains from trade. In view of the fact that proposers had not been informed about responders' previous acceptance thresholds such low offers are remarkable. In the final period all offers were below 25 percent while in the ultimatum game such 9 Rejection rates in Slovenia and the USA were significantly higher than rejection rates in Japan and Israel. 10 In the presence of a smallest money unit ε there exists an additional, slightly different equilibrium outcome: The proposer offers s = ε which is accepted by all the responders. To support this equilibrium all responders have to reject s = 0. We assume, however, that there is no smallest money unit. 11 The gains from trade were 50 French Francs. Before observing the offer s each responder stated an acceptance threshold. If s was above the threshold the responder accepted the offer, if it was below she rejected s.
low offers are very rare. 12 To what extent is this apparent willingness to make and to accept extremely low offers compatible with the existence of inequity averse subjects? As the following proposition shows our model can account for the above regularities.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose β 1 < (n-1)/n. Then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which all responders accept any s ≥ 0 and the proposer offers s=0. The highest offer s that can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is given by
Proof: See Appendix.
The first part of Proposition 3 shows that responder competition always ensures the existence of an equilibrium in which all the gains from trade are reaped by the proposer irrespective of the prevailing amount of inequity aversion among the responders. This result is not affected if there is incomplete information about the types of players and is based on the following intuition. Given that there is at least one other responder j who is going to accept an offer of 0, there is no way how responder i can affect the outcome and he may just as well accept this offer, too. Note, however, that the proposer will offer s=0 only if β 1 < (n-1)/n. If there are n players altogether, than giving away one Dollar to one of the responders reduces inequality by 1 + [1/(n-1)] = n/(n-1) Dollars. Thus, if the nonpecuniary gain from this reduction in inequality, β 1 [n/(n-1)], exceeds the cost of 1, player 1 prefers to give away money to one of the responders.
Recall that in the bilateral ultimatum game the proposer offered an equal split if β 1 > 0.5. An interesting aspect of our model is that an increase in the number of responders renders s = 0.5 less likely because it increases the threshold β 1 has to pass.
The second part of Proposition 3 shows, however, that there may also be other equilibria.
Clearly, a positive share s can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium only if all responders can credibly threaten to reject any s' < s. When is it optimal to carry out this threat?
Suppose that s < 0.5 has been offered and that this offer is being rejected by all other responders j ≠ i. In this case responder i can enforce an egalitarian outcome by rejecting the offer as well.
Rejecting reduces not only the inequality towards the other responders but also the disadvantageous inequality towards the proposer. Therefore, responder i is willing to reject this offer if nobody else accepts it and if the offer is sufficiently small, i.e., if the disadvantageous inequality towards the proposer is sufficiently large. More formally, given that all other responders reject, responder i prefers to reject as well if and only if the utility of acceptance
This is equivalent to
Thus, an offer s >0 can be sustained if and only if (10) holds for all responders. It is interesting to note that the highest sustainable offer does not depend on all the parameters α i and β i but only on the inequity aversion of the responder with the lowest acceptance threshold s i '. In particular, if there is only one responder with α i =0, Proposition 3 implies that there is a unique equilibrium outcome with s=0. Furthermore, the acceptance threshold is decreasing with n. Thus, the model makes the intuitively appealing prediction that for n → ∞ the highest sustainable equilibrium offer converges to zero whatever the prevailing amount of inequity aversion.
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IV. COOPERATION AND RETALIATION -COOPERATION GAMES
In the previous section we have shown that our model can account for the relatively "fair" outcomes in the bilateral ultimatum game as well as for the rather "unfair" or "competitive" outcomes in games with proposer or responder competition. In this section we investigate the conditions under which cooperation can flourish in the presence of inequity aversion. We show that inequity aversion improves the prospects for voluntary cooperation relative to the predictions of the standard model. In particular, we show that there is an interesting class of conditions under which the selfish model predicts complete defection while in our model there exist equilibria in which everybody cooperates fully. But, there are also other cases where the predictions of our model coincide with the predictions of the standard model.
We start with the following public good game. There are n ≥ 2 players who decide simultaneously on their contribution levels g i ∈[0,y], i∈{1,...,n}, to the public good. Each player has an endowment of y. The monetary payoff of player i is given by Player i may, however, also be punished by the other players which generates an income loss to i
Thus, the monetary payoff of player i is given by
What does the standard model predict for the two-stage game? Since punishments are costly players' dominant strategy at stage two is to not punish. Therefore, if selfishness and rationality are common knowledge, each player knows that the second stage is completely irrelevant. As a consequence, players have exactly the same incentives at stage 1 as they have in the one-stage game without punishments, i.e., each player's optimal strategy is still given by g i =
0.
To what extent are these predictions of the standard model consistent with the data from public good experiments. For the one-stage-game there are, fortunately, a large number of experimental studies. They investigate the contribution behavior of subjects under a wide variety of conditions. In the following we concentrate on the behavior of subjects in the final period only since we want to exclude the possibility of repeated games effects. Furthermore, in the final period we have more confidence that the players fully understand the game that is being played.
14 The behavior in the game with punishment represents an unambiguous rejection of the striking fact revealed by Table II is that in the final period the vast majority of subjects plays the equilibrium strategy of complete free-riding. If we average over all studies 73 percent of all subjects choose g i = 0 in the final period. It is also worth mentioning that in addition to those subjects who play exactly the equilibrium strategy there is very often a nonnegligible fraction of subjects who play "close" to the equilibrium. In view of the facts presented in Table II it seems fair to say that the standard model "approximates" the choices of a big majority of subjects rather well.
However, if we turn to the public good game with punishment there emerges a radically different picture although the standard model predicts the same outcome as in the one-stage game. Figure 2 shows the distribution of contributions in the final period of the two-stage game conducted by . Note that the same subjects generated the distribution in the game without and in the game with punishment. Whereas in the game without punishment most subjects play close to complete defection a strikingly large fraction of roughly 80 percent cooperates fully in the game with punishment. 15 Fehr and Gächter report that the vast majority of punishments is imposed by cooperators on the defectors and that lower contribution levels are associated with higher received punishments. Thus, defectors do not gain from free-riding because they are being punished.
The behavior in the game with punishment represents an unambiguous rejection of the standard model. This raises the question whether our model is capable of explaining both the evidence of the one-stage public good game and of the public good game with punishment.
Consider the one-stage public good game first. The prediction of our model is summarized in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4. The formal proof of Proposition 4 is relegated to the Appendix. To see the basic intuition 15 Subjects in the Fehr and Gächter study participated in both conditions, i.e. in the game with punishment and in the game without punishment. The parameter values for a and n in this experiment are a=0.4 and n=4. It is interesting to note that contributions are significantly higher in the two-stage game already in period one. Moreover, in the one-stage game cooperation strongly decreases over time whereas in the two-stage game cooperation quickly converges to the high levels observed in period ten. for the above results consider a player with a+β i < 1. By spending one Dollar on the public good he earns a Dollars in monetary terms. In addition he may get a non-pecuniary benefit of at most β i Dollars from reducing inequality. Therefore, since a+β i <1 for this player, it is a dominant strategy for him to contribute nothing. Part (b) of the proposition says that if the fraction of subjects, for whom g i =0 is a dominant strategy, is sufficiently high, there is a unique equilibrium in which nobody contributes. The reason is that if there are only a few players with a+β i >1, they would suffer too much from the disadvantageous inequality caused by the free-riders. The proof of the proposition shows that if a potential contributor knows that the number of free riders, k, is larger than a(n-1)/2, then he will not contribute either. The last part of the proposition shows that if there are sufficiently many players with a+β i >1, they can sustain cooperation among themselves even if the other players do not contribute. This requires, however, that the contributors are not too upset about the disadvantageous inequality towards the free riders. Note that the condition k/(n-1) < (a+β j -1)/(α j +β j ) is less likely to be met as α j goes up. To put it differently: The greater the aversion against being the sucker the more difficult it is to sustain cooperation in the one-stage game. We will see below that the opposite holds true in the two-stage game.
Note that in almost all experiments considered in Table II a≤1/2. Thus, if the fraction of players with a+β i < 1 is larger than 1/4, then there is no equilibrium with positive contribution levels. This is consistent with the very low contribution levels that have been observed in these experiments. Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the prospects for cooperation are weakly increasing with the marginal return a.
Consider now the public good game with punishment. To what extent is our model capable of accounting for the very high cooperation in the public good game with punishment. In the context of our model the crucial point is that free-riding generates a material payoff advantage relative to those who cooperate. Since c < 1, cooperators can reduce this payoff disadvantage by punishing the free-riders. Therefore, if those who cooperate are sufficiently upset by the inequality to their disadvantage, i.e., if they have sufficiently high α's , then they are willing to punish the defectors even though this is costly to themselves. Thus, the threat to punish freeriders may be credible, which may induce potential defectors to contribute at the first stage of the game. This is made precise in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that there is a group of n' "conditionally cooperative enforcers", 1 ≤ n' ≤ n, with preferences that obey a+β i ≥ 1 and
whereas all other players do not care about inequality, i.e. α i = β i = 0 for i∈{n'+1,...,n}.
Then the following strategies, that describe the players' behavior on and off the equilibrium path, form a subgame perfect equilibrium: Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that full cooperation, as observed in the experiments by , can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome if there is a group of n' "conditionally cooperative enforcers". In fact, one such enforcer may be enough (n'=1) if his preferences satisfy c < α i /(n-1)(1+α i ) and a+β i ≥ 1, i.e., if there is one person who is sufficiently concerned about inequality. To see how the equilibrium works consider such a "conditionally cooperative enforcer". For him a+β i ≥ 1, so he is happy to cooperate if all others cooperate as well (this is why he is called "conditionally cooperative"). In addition, condition (13) makes sure that he cares sufficiently about inequality to his disadvantage. Thus he can credibly threaten to punish a defector (this is why he is called "enforcer"). Note that condition (13) is less demanding if n' or α i increases. The punishment is constructed such that the defector gets the same monetary payoff as the enforcers. Since this is less than what a defector would have received if he had chosen g i = g, a deviation is not profitable.
If the conditions of Proposition 5 are met, then there exists a continuum of equilibrium outcomes. This continuum includes the "good equilibrium" with maximum contributions but also the "bad equilibrium" where nobody contributes to the public good. In our view there is, however, a reasonable refinement argument that rules out "bad" equilibria with low contributions.
To see this note that the equilibrium with the highest possible contribution level, g i =g=y for all i∈{1,...,n}, is the unique symmetric and efficient outcome. Since it is symmetric it yields the same payoff for all players. Hence, this equilibrium is a natural focal point which serves as a coordination device even if the subjects choose their strategies independently.
Comparing Propositions 4 and 5, it is easy to see that the prospects for cooperation are greatly improved if there is an opportunity to punish defectors. Without punishments all players with a+β i < 1 will never contribute. Players with a+β i > 1 may contribute only if they care enough about inequality to their advantage but not too much about disadvantageous inequality.
On the other hand, with punishments all players will contribute if there is a (small) group of "conditionally cooperative enforcers". The more these enforcers care about disadvantageous inequality the more they are prepared to punish defectors which makes it easier to sustain cooperation. In fact, one person with a sufficiently high α i is already enough to enforce efficient contributions by all other players.
V. PREDICTIONS ACROSS GAMES
In this section we examine whether the distribution of parameters that is consistent with experimental observations in the ultimatum game is consistent with the experimental evidence from the other games. It is not our aim here to explain 100 percent of the individual choices. The objective is rather to offer a first test for whether there is a chance that our theory is consistent with the quantitative evidence from different games. Admittedly, this test is rather crude.
However, at the end of this section we make a number of predictions that are implied by our model and we suggest how these predictions can be tested rigorously with some new experiments.
In many of the experiments referred to in this section the subjects had to play several times the same game either with the same or with varying opponents. Whenever available, we take the data of the final period as the facts to be explained. There are two reasons for this choice. First, it is well known in experimental economics that in interactive situations one cannot expect the subjects to play an equilibrium in the first period already. Yet, if subjects have the opportunity to repeat their choices and to better understand the strategic interaction, then very often rather stable behavioral patterns, that may differ substantially from first-period-play, emerge. Second, if there is repeated interaction between the same opponents then there may be repeated games effects that come into play. These effects can be excluded if we look at the last period only. Table III suggests a simple discrete distribution of α i and β i . We have chosen this distribution because it is consistent with the large experimental evidence we have on the ultimatum game [see Table I above and Roth 1995] . Recall from Proposition 1 that for any given α i , there exists an acceptance threshold s'(α i ) = α i /(1+2α i ) such that player i accepts s if and only if s ≥ s'(α i ). In all experiments there is a fraction of subjects that rejects offers even if they are very close to an equal split. Thus, we (conservatively) assume that 10 percent of the subjects have α=4 which implies an acceptance threshold of s'=4/9=0.444. Another, typically much larger fraction of the population insists on getting at least one third of the surplus, which implies a value of α which is equal to one. These are at least 30 percent of the population. Note that they are prepared to give up one Dollar if this reduces the payoff of their opponent by two Dollars. Another, say, 30 percent of the subjects insists on getting at least one quarter, which implies α=0.5. Finally, the remaining 30 percent of the subjects do not care very much about inequality and are happy to accept any positive offer (α=0). If a proposer does not know the parameter α of his opponent but believes that the probability distribution over α is given by Table 3 , then it is straightforward to compute his optimal offer as a function of his inequality parameter β. The optimal offer is given by gives us the distribution of β in the population described in Table III .
TABLE III ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES
DISTRIBUTION OF α'S
Let us now see whether this distribution of preferences is consistent with the observed behavior in other games. Clearly, we have no problem to explain the evidence on market games with proposer competition. Any distribution of α and β yields the competitive outcome which is observed by Roth et al. [1991] in all their experiments. Similarly, in the market game with responder competition, we know from Proposition 3 that if there is at least one responder who does not care about disadvantageous inequality (i.e., α i = 0), then there is a unique equilibrium outcome with 0 = s . With five responders in the experiments by Güth, Marchand and Rulliere [1997] and with the distribution of types from Table III , the probability that there is at least one such player in each group is given by 1-0.7 5 = 83 percent. This is roughly consistent with the fact that 71 percent of the players accepted an offer of zero, and nine percent had an acceptance threshold of s' = 0.02 in the final period.
Consider now the public good game. We know by Proposition 4 that cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome only if the number k of players with a+β i < 1 obeys k/(n-1) < a/2. Thus, our theory predicts that there is less cooperation the smaller a which is consistent with the empirical evidence of Isaac and Walker [1988] presented in Table II . 16 In a typical treatment a=0.5 and n=4. Therefore, if all players believe that there is at least one player with a+β i < 1, then there is a unique equilibrium with g i =0 for all players. Given the distribution of preferences of Table III , the probability that there are four players with β>0.5 is equal to 0.4 4 =2.56 percent. Hence, we should observe that, on average, almost all individuals fully defect. A similar result holds for most other experiments in Table II . Except for the Isaac and Walker experiments with n = 10 a single player with a+β i < 1 is sufficient for the violation of the necessary condition for cooperation, k/(n-1) < a/2. Thus in all these experiments our theory predicts that randomly chosen groups are almost never capable of sustaining cooperation. Table   2 indicates that this is not quite the case although 73 percent of individuals choose indeed g i =0.
Thus, it seems fair to say that our model is consistent with the bulk of individual choices in this game.
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Finally, the most interesting experiment from the perspective of our theory is the public good game with punishment. While in the game without punishment most subjects play close to complete defection, a strikingly large fraction of roughly 80 percent cooperates fully in the game with punishment. To what extent can our model explain this phenomenon? We know from Proposition 5 that cooperation can be sustained if there is a group of n' "conditionally cooperative enforcers" with preferences that satisfy (13) and a+β i ≥ 1. For example, if all four players believe that there is at least one player with α i ≥ 1.5 and β i ≥ 0.6, there is an equilibrium in which all four players contribute the maximum amount. As discussed in Section V, this equilibrium is a natural focal point. Since the computations of the probability that the conditions of Proposition 5 are met is a bit more cumbersome we have put them into the appendix. It turns out that for the preference distribution given in Table III suggests that it will be more difficult to sustain cooperation if the game is asymmetric. For example, if the public good is more valuable to some of the players there will in general be a conflict between efficiency and equality. Our prediction is that if the game is sufficiently asymmetric it is impossible to sustain cooperation even if a is very large or if players can use punishments.
♦ It would be interesting to repeat the public good experiment with punishments for different values of a, c and n. Proposition 5 suggest that we should observe less cooperation if a goes down and if c goes up. The effect of an increase in the group size n is ambiguous, however.
For any given player it becomes more difficult to satisfy condition (13) as n goes up. On the other hand, the larger the group the higher is the probability that there is at least one person the view that human choice is characterised by a fundamental randomness [McKelvey and Palfrey 1995] may explain much of the remaining 25 percent of individual choices. This task is, however, left for future research. 18 In this context one has to take into account that the total number of available individual observations in the game with punishment is much smaller than for the game without punishment or for the ultimatum game. Future experiments will have to show whether the Fehr-Gächter results are the rule in the punishment game or whether they exhibit unusually high cooperation rates. 19 We are grateful to a referee who suggested some of these tests.
with a very high α. Our conjecture is that a moderate change in the size of the group does not affect the amount of cooperation.
♦ One of the most interesting tests of our theory would be to do several different experiments with the same group of subjects. Our model predicts a cross-situation correlation in behavior.
For example, the observations from one experiment could be used to estimate the parameters of the utility function of each individual. It would then be possible to test whether this individual's behavior in other games is consistent with his estimated utility function.
♦ In a similar fashion, one could screen subjects according to their behavior in one experiment before doing a public good experiment with punishments. If we group the subjects in this second experiment according to their observed inequality aversion, the prediction is that those groups with high inequality aversion will contribute while those with low inequality aversion will not.
♦ A further implication of our model is that there will be more cooperation in a sequentially played Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) compared to a simultaneously played PD. The simultaneous PD is just a special case of the public good game analyzed in Section IV for n = 2 and g i ∈{0,y}, i = 1,2. Therefore, Proposition 4 applies, i. e., cooperation is an equilibrium if both players meet the condition a+β i > 1. Yet, if only one player meets this condition defection of both players is the unique equilibrium. In contrast, in a sequentially played PD a purely selfish first mover has an incentive to contribute if he faces a second mover who meets a+β i > 1. This is so because the second mover will respond cooperatively to a cooperative first move while he defects if the first mover defects.
VI. DICTATOR AND GIFT EXCHANGE GAMES
The preceding sections have shown that our very simple model of linear inequality aversion can explain the most important facts in ultimatum, market and cooperation games. One problem of our approach is, however, that it yields too extreme predictions in some other games, such as the "dictator game". The dictator game is a two person game in which only player 1, the "dictator", has to make a decision. Player 1 has to decide what share s ∈ [0,1] of a given amount of money to pass on to player 2. For a given share s monetary payoffs are given by x 1 = 1 -s and x 2 = s, respectively. Obviously, the standard model predicts s = 0. In contrast, in the experimental study of Forsythe et al. [1994] only about 20 percent of subjects chose s = 0, 60 percent chose 0 < s < 0.5, and again roughly 20 percent chose s = 0.5. In the study of Andreoni and Miller [1995] the distribution of shares is again bimodal but puts more weight on the "extremes": Approximately 40 percent of the subjects gave s = 0, 20 percent gave 0 < s < 0.5, and roughly 40 percent gave s = 0.5. Shares above s = 0.5 were practically never observed.
Our model predicts that player 1 offers s = 0.5 if β 1 > 0.5 and s = 0 if β 1 < 0.5. Thus we should observe only very "fair" or very "unfair" outcomes, a prediction that is clearly refuted by the data. However, there is a straightforward solution to this problem. We assumed that the inequality aversion is piecewise linear. The linearity assumption was imposed in order to keep our model as simple as possible. If we allow for a utility function that is concave in the amount of advantageous inequality, there is no problem to generate optimal offers that are in the interior
It is important to note that non-linear inequality aversion does not affect the qualitative results in the other games we considered. This is straightforward in market games with proposer or responder competition. Recall that in the context of proposer competition there exists a unique equilibrium outcome in which the responder receives the whole gains from trade irrespective of the prevailing amount of inequality aversion. Thus, it also does not matter whether linear or nonlinear inequality aversion prevails. Likewise, under responder competition there is a unique equilibrium outcome in which the proposer receives the whole surplus if there is at least one responder who does not care about disadvantageous inequality. Obviously, this proposition holds irrespective of whether the inequality aversion of the other responders is linear or not. Similar arguments hold for public good games with and without punishment. Concerning the public good game with punishment, for example, the existence of nonlinear inequality aversion obviously does not invalidate the existence of an equilibrium with full cooperation. It only renders the condition for the existence of such an equilibrium, i.e., condition (13), slightly more complicated.
Another interesting game is the so-called trust-or gift exchange game [Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993; Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997] . The common feature of trust-or gift exchange games is that they resemble a sequentially played PD with more than two actions for each player. In some experiments the gift exchange game has been embedded in a competitive experimental market. A slightly simplified version of the experiment conducted by Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger [1997] has, for example, the following structure.
There is one experimental firm, which we denote as player 1, and which can make a wage offer w to the experimental workers. There are 2, ..., n workers who can simultaneously accept or reject w. Then a random draw selects with equal probability one of the accepting workers. Thereafter, the selected worker has to choose effort e from the interval [ _ e , To what extent can our model explain this outcome? Put differently, why is it the case that under responder competition without effort choice the responders' income converges towards the selfish solution, whereas under responder competition with effort choice, wages substantially above the selfish solution can be maintained. From the viewpoint of our model the key fact is that by paying high wages firms generate a payoff advantage for the accepting worker who is selected. Therefore, if this workers has a sufficiently high β i he is willing to choose an effort above _ e because this reduces the payoff advantage relative to the other players. Moreover, the higher w the higher the effort level the worker is willing to choose. This generates a positive correlation between wages and effort and makes a high wage policy profitable. Since this incentive for paying high wages is absent under responder competition without effort choice responders' income shares converge to the selfish solution in this condition. Hence, our model is also consistent with the divergence of outcomes under responder competition with and without effort choice.
VII. OBJECTIONS AND DISCUSSION
So far we ruled out the existence of subjects who like to be better off than others. This is unsatisfactory because subjects with β i < 0 clearly exist. Fortunately, however, such subjects have virtually no impact on equilibrium behavior in the games considered in this paper. To see this, suppose that a fraction of subjects with β i = 0 exhibits, instead, β i < 0. This obviously does not change responders' behavior in the ultimatum game because for them only α i matters. It also does not change the proposer behavior in the complete information case because both proposers with β i = 0 and those with β i < 0 will make an offer that exactly matches the responder's acceptance threshold. 20 In the market game with proposer competition proposers 20 It may affect proposer behavior in the incomplete information case although the effect of a change in βi is ambiguous. This ambiguity stems from the fact that the proposer's marginal expected utility of s may rise or fall if with β i < 0 are even more willing to overbid a going share below s = 1, compared to subjects with β i = 0, because by overbidding they gain a payoff advantage relative to the other proposers.
Thus, Proposition 2 remains unchanged. Similar arguments apply to the case of responder competition (without effort choices) because a responder with β i < 0 is even more willing to underbid a positive share compared to a responder with β i = 0. In the public good game without punishment all players with a+β i < 1 have a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. It does not matter whether these players exhibit a positive or a negative β i . Finally, the existence of β i < 0 types also leaves Proposition 5 unchanged. 21 If there are sufficiently many conditionally cooperative enforcers it does not matter whether the remaining players have β i < 0 or not. Recall that -according to Proposition 5 -strategies that discipline potential defectors make the enforcers and the defectors equally well off in material terms. Hence, a defector cannot gain a payoff advantage but is even worse off relative to a cooperating nonenforcer. These punishment strategies, therefore, are sufficient to discipline potential defectors irrespective of their β i -values.
Another set of questions concerns the choice of the reference group. As argued in Section II, for many laboratory experiments our assumption that subjects compare themselves to all other subjects in the (usually relatively small) group is a natural starting point. However, we are aware of the possibility that this may not always be an appropriate assumption. There may well be interactive structures in which some agents have a salient position which makes them natural reference agents. Moreover, the social context and the institutional environment in which interactions take place is likely to be important. 22 Bewley [1998] , for example, reports that in non-unionized firms workers compare themselves exclusively with their firm and with other workers in their firm. This suggests that only within-firm social comparisons but not across-firm comparisons affect the wage setting process. This is likely to be different in unionized sectors because unions make across-firm and even across sector comparisons. Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein [1996] , for example, provide evidence that wage bargaining between teachers' unions and school boards is strongly affected by reference wages in other school districts.
An obvious limitation of our model is that it cannot explain the evolution of play over time in the experiments discussed. Instead, our examination aims at the explanation of the stable behavioral patterns that emerge in these experiments after several periods. It is clear, that a model that solely focuses on equilibrium behavior cannot explain the time path of play. This limitation βi falls. 21 This holds true if, for those with a negative βi, the abolute value of βi is not too large. Otherwise defectors would have an incentive to punish the cooperators. A defector who imposes a punishment of one on a cooperator gains [-βi /(n-1)](1-c) > 0 in nonpecuniary terms and has materaial costs of c. Thus, he is willing to punish if |βi| ≥ [c/(1-c)](n-1) holds. This means that only defectors with implausibly high absolute values of βi are willing to punish. For example, for c = 0.5 and n = 4, |βi| ≥ 3 is required. For c = 0.2 and n = 4, |βi| still has to exceed 0.75. 22 A related issue is the impact of social context on a person's degree of inequity aversion. It seems likely that a person has a different degree of inequity aversion when interacting with a friend in personal matters than in a business transaction with a stranger. In fact evidence for this is provided by Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman [1989] . Note, however, that in all experiments considered above interaction took place among anonymous strangers in a neutrally framed context. of our model also precludes a rigorous analysis of the short-run impact of equity considerations. 23 The empirical evidence suggests that equity considerations also have important short run effects. This is obvious in ultimatum games, public good games with punishment and gift exchange games where equity consideration lead to substantial deviations from the selfish solution in the short and in the long run. However, they also seem to play a short run role in market games with proposer or responder competition or public good games without punishment, that is, in games in which the selfish solution prevails in the long run. In these games the short-run deviation from equilibrium is typically in the direction of more equitable outcomes.
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To our knowledge there are four other approaches which try to account for persistent deviations from the predictions of the self-interest model in terms of different motives. Andreoni and Miller [1995] is based on the assumption of altruistic motives. Levine [forthcoming] assumes that people are either spiteful or altruistic to various degrees A third approach is the model of which is also based on a kind of inequity aversion. Finally, there is the approach, pioneered by Rabin [1993] , which emphasizes the role of intentions as a source of reciprocal behavior. Rabin developed this approach in the context of two-person normal form games. It has recently been extended to extensive form games by Falk and Fischbacher [1998] and to the n-person case by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [1998] .
The altruism approach can explain voluntary giving in dictator and public good games. It is, however, inconsistent with the rejection of offers in the ultimatum game and it cannot explain the huge behavioral differences between public good games with and without punishment. It also seems difficult to reconcile the extreme outcomes in market games with altruism. Levine's approach can explain extreme outcomes in market games as well as the evidence in the centipede game but has difficulties in explaining giving in the dictator game. His approach also rules out that one person can be both spiteful and altruistic. Inequity aversion, in contrast, allows for this. In the domain of advantageous inequality a person may behave in an altruistic manner while in the domain of disadvantageous inequality the same person may behave in a spiteful manner. The approach by Bolton and Ockenfels is similar to our model although there are some important differences in the details. For example, in their model people compare their material payoff to the material average payoff of the group. In our view the appropriate choice of the reference payoff 23 In the short-run minor changes in the (experimental) context can affect behavior. For example, there is evidence that subjects contribute more in a one-shot PD if it is called "community game" than if it is called "wall street game". Under the plausible assumption that the community frame triggers more optimistic beliefs about other subjects inequity aversion our model is consistent with this observation. 24 Such short-run effects also are suggested by the results of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986] and Franciosi et al. [1995] . Franciosi et al. show that -in a competitve experimental market (without effort choices) -equity considerations significantly retard the adjustment to the (selfish) equilibrium. Ultimately, they do, however, not prevent full adjustment to the equilibrium. Note that the retardation effect suggests that temporary demand shocks (e. g., after a natural desaster) may have no impact on prices at all because the shock vanishes before competitive forces can overcome the fairness induced resistance to price changes.
is ultimately an empirical question that cannot be solved on the presently available evidence.
There may well be situations in which the average payoff may be the appropriate choice.
However, in the context of the public good game with punishment it seems to be inappropriate because it cannot explain why cooperators want to punish a defector. If there are, say, n-1 fully cooperating subjects and one fully defecting subject, the payoff of each cooperator is below the group's average payoff. Cooperators can reduce this difference between own payoff and the group's average payoff by punishing one of the other players, i. e. they are indifferent between punishing other cooperators or the defector.
The theory of reciprocity as developed by Rabin rests on the attractive idea that people are willing to punish unfair intentions and reward fair intentions. The theory provides, therefore, a rationale for reciprocal behavior. Note, however, that inequity aversion can also account for reciprocal behavior as, for example, observed in gift exchange or ultimatum games. In our view both intentions and inequity aversion are important motivational sources of reciprocal behavior.
Intuitively, we believe that intentions are likely to be more important in the domain of punishing behavior (e.g., in the ultimatum game) while inequity aversion might be more important in the domain of rewarding behavior (e.g. in the gift exchange game). There is some evidence for this viewpoint. Blount [1995] conducted ultimatum games and Charness [forthcoming] conducted bilateral gift exchange games in the following two conditions. In the "random" condition a random mechanism determined the first mover choice. In the "intention" condition proposers themselves made the decision. If inequity aversion is the sole source of reciprocity responder behavior should not differ across conditions. If only intentions matter reciprocal responses should be observed only in the "intention" condition. In fact, in both experiments reciprocal behavior is observed in both conditions. Yet, in the ultimatum game behavioral differences across conditions are large whereas in the gift exchange game they are small.
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VIII. SUMMARY
There are situations in which the standard self-interest model is unambiguously refuted.
However, in other situations the predictions of this model seem to be very accurate. For example, in simple experiments like the ultimatum game, the public good game with punishments or the gift exchange game the vast majority of the subjects behaves in a "fair" and "cooperative" manner although the self-interest model predicts very "unfair" and "noncooperative" behavior. Yet, there are also experiments like, e.g., market games or public good games without punishment, in which the vast majority of the subjects behaves in a rather "unfair" and "noncooperative" way -as predicted by the self-interest model. We show that this puzzling evidence can be explained in a coherent framework if -in addition to purely selfish people -there is a fraction of the population that is inequity averse. Our theory of inequity aversion is motivated by the psychological evidence on social comparisons and loss aversion. It is very simple and can be applied to any game. The predictions of our model are consistent with the empirical evidence on all of the above mentioned games. Our theory also has strong empirical implications for many other games. Therefore, it is an important task for future research to test our theory more rigorously against competing hypothesis.
A main insight of our analysis is that there is an important interaction between the distribution of preferences in a given population and the strategic environment. We have shown that there are environments in which the behavior of a minority of purely selfish people forces the majority of inequity averse people to behave in a completely selfish manner, too. For example, if the environment is very competitive -as in a market game with proposer or responder competition -it is very difficult, if not impossible, for inequity averse players to achieve a "fair" outcome. We have also shown, however, that there are environments where the opposite is true: in the public good game with punishment or the gift exchange game the behavior of a relatively small number of inequity averse people can create incentives for the selfish types to behave in a "fair" and "cooperative" way as well. We believe that this interaction between the distribution of preferences and the economic environment deserves much more attention in future research.
A1
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2: We first show that it is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium if at least two proposers offer s=1 which is accepted by the responder. Note first that the responder will accept any offer ,
To see this, note that (A1) is equivalent to
which must be the case since s ≤ 1.Hence, the buyer will accept s=1. Given that there is at least one other proposer who offers s=1 and given that this offer will be accepted, each proposer gets a monetary payoff of 0 anyway and no proposer can affect this outcome. Hence, it is indeed optimal for at least one other proposer to offer s=1, too.
Next, we show that this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Suppose that there is an other equilibrium in which 1 < s with positive probability. This is only possible if each proposer offers s i <1 with positive probability. Let s i be the lowest offer of proposer i that has positive probability.
It cannot be the case that player i puts strictly positive probability on offers s i ∈[ s i , s j ) because the probability that he wins with such an offer is zero. To see this note that in this case player i would
On the other hand, if proposer i chooses s i ∈(max j≠i { s j , 0.5},1), then there is a positive probability that he will win in which case he gets
Of course, there may also be a positive probability that proposer i does not win, but in this case he gets again -α i /(n-1). Thus, proposer i would deviate. It follows that it must be the case that s i = s for all i.
Suppose that proposer i changes his strategy and offers s +ε < 1 in all states when his strategy would have required him to choose s . The cost of this change is that whenever proposer i would have won with the offer s he now receives only 1-s -ε. However, by making ε arbitrarily small, this cost becomes arbitrarily small. The benefit is that there are now some states of the world which have strictly positive probability in which proposer i does win with the offer s +ε but in which he would not have won with the offer s . This benefit is strictly positive and does not go to zero as ε becomes small. Hence, s <1 cannot be part of an equilibrium outcome.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We first show that s=1, which is accepted by all responders, is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium. Note that any offer s ≥ 0 5
. will be accepted by all responders. The argument is exactly the same as the one in the beginning of the proof of Proposition 1. The following Lemma will be useful:
Lemma 1 For any s < 0.5 there exists a continuation equilibrium in which everybody accepts s.
Given that all other players accept s player i prefers to accept as well if and only if
which is equivalent to
n .
Since we assume 1 < i β , this inequality must hold.o Consider now the proposer. Clearly, it is never optimal to offer s > 0.5. Such an offer is always dominated by s = 0.5 which yields a higher monetary payoff and less inequality. On the other hand, we know by Lemma 1 that for any s ≤ 0 5 . there exists a continuation equilibrium in which this offer is accepted by everybody. Thus, we only have to look for the optimal s from the point of view of the proposer given that s will be accepted. His payoff function is 
Hence, if this condition holds, it is an equilibrium that the proposer offers s = 0 which is accepted by all responders. We now show that the highest offer that can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is given by (8).
Lemma 2 Suppose that s < 0.5 has been offered. There exists a continuation equilibrium in which this offer is rejected by all responders if and only if
Given that all other responders reject s, responder i will reject s as well if and only if
which is equivalent to (A11). Thus, (A11) is a sufficient condition for a continuation equilibrium in which s is rejected by everybody.
Suppose now that (A11) is violated for at least one { } i n ∈ 2,..., . We want to show that in this case there is no continuation equilibrium in which s is rejected by everybody. Note first, that in this case responder i prefers to accept s if all other responders reject it. Suppose now that at least one other responder accepts s. In this case responder i prefers to accept s as well if and only if
The right hand side of this inequality is smaller than 0. We know already that the left hand side is greater than 0 since (A11) is violated. Therefore, responder i prefers to accept s as well. We conclude that if (A11) does not hold for at least one i, then at least one responder will accept s.
Hence, (A11) is also necessary.o
, an equilibrium offer must be sustained by the threat that any smaller offer s will be rejected by everybody. But we know from Lemma 2 that an offer s may be rejected only if (A11) holds for all i. Thus, the highest offer s that can be sustained in equilibrium is given by (8 
player l prefers to deviate from the equilibrium candidate and to choose g l =0. But this inequality is equivalent to
which is the condition given in the proposition. 
= x i
Thus, given the punishment strategy of the enforcers, deviators cannot get a higher payoff than the enforcers. However, they get a strictly lower payoff than the non-enforcers who did not deviate. We now have to check that the punishment strategies are credible, i.e. that an enforcer cannot gain from reducing his p ij . If an enforcer reduces p ij by ε he saves cε and experiences less disadvantageous inequality relative to those (n -n' -1) players who chose g but do not punish.
This creates a non-pecuniary utility gain of [α i (n -n' -1)cε]/(n -1).
On the other hand, the enforcer also has non-pecuniary costs because he experiences now disadvantageous inequality relative to the defector and a distributional advantage relative to the other (n' -1) enforcers who punish fully. The latter generates a utility loss of β i (n' -1)cε/(n -1) whereas the former reduces utility by α i (1 -c)ε/(n -1). Thus the loss from a reduction in p ij is greater than the gain if Q.E.D.
Computation of the probability that there are conditionally cooperative enforcers:
To compute the probability that, in a randomly drawn group of four, there are subjects who obey condition (13) and a+β i ≥ 1, we have to make an assumption about the correlation between α i and β i We mentioned already that the empirical evidence suggests that these parameters are positively correlated. For concreteness we assume that the correlation is perfect. Thus, in terms of Table III, all players with α=1 or α=4 are assumed to have β=0.6. This is clearly not fully realistic, but it simplifies the analysis dramatically.
In the Fehr-Gächter experiment the relevant parameters are a=0.4, n=4, and (roughly 26 ) c=0.2.
The following summary states the conditions on α i and β i implied by Proposition 5 for a group of n'∈{1, ..., 4} conditionally cooperative enforcers. If one of these conditions holds, cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium:
(i) n'=1, α i ≥ 1.5 and β i ≥ 0.6.
(ii) n'=2, α i ≥ 1 -0. 3β i and β i ≥ 0.6.
(iii) n'=3, α i ≥ 0.75 -0.5β i and β i ≥ 0.6.
(iv) n'=4, α i ≥ 0.6 -0.6β i and β i ≥ 0.6.
Note that for each group n' of conditionally cooperative enforcers the conditions on α i and β i have to hold simultaneously. Given the discrete distribution of α and β of Table 3 this can only be the case if • there is at least one player with α i = 4 and β i = 0.6, or • there are at least two players with α i = 1 and β i = 0.6, or • both.
Given the numbers of Table III it is not difficult to show that the probability that one of these cases applies is equal to 61.12 percent.
